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Abstract: Combining scenario construction with the characteristics of individual emergency 
behavior is necessary for the emergency route planning of major chemical accidents. We 
investigated this challenging decision problem and constructed a multi-indicator emergency 
risk assessment method that considers the evacuation speed of different population types and 
health consequences caused by various risk components. We also designed a modified Dijkstra 
algorithm to solve this dynamic multi-objective route planning problem. The comparative 
experiment results demonstrated that the proposed algorithm performs relatively better than 
the traditional Dijkstra algorithm. Finally, we performed extensive case studies where our 
simulation results demonstrate that the proposed model provides reliable and practical 
emergency route planning services for various personnel types under different accident 
scenarios. Compared with the commonly used single-dimensional assessment method, this 
comprehensive and informative assessment of the emergency risks faced by the population in 
different regions could serve as a useful reference for the formulation and implementation of 
emergency plans in case of major chemical accidents. 
 
Keywords: emergency route planning; dynamic optimization; the modified Dijkstra algorithm; 
major chemical accidents; emergency risk assessment. 
1. Introduction 
The rapid development of the global economy has resulted in the considerable increase 
in the number of industrial parks or projects involving flammable, explosive, toxic, and 
hazardous substances in recent years (Zhou and Liu, 2012; Hosseinnia et al., 2018; Reniers 
and Soudan, 2010). Any anticipated hazards are mainly due to human errors, faulty equipment, 
poor production management, or inappropriate environmental conditions. These major hazards 
within a region may lead to accidents such as leaks, fire, explosion, or toxic proliferation (Zhou 
and Liu, 2012). Two main public protective actions are implemented in such situations: to 
shelter in place or to conduct emergency evacuations. The first option is preferred if the 
available shelters can provide adequate protection to the affected population, (Sorensen et al., 
2004; Jann, 1989; Ujihara, 1989). However, the number of shelters in any affected area is 
usually limited and the facilities are often not equipped to provide adequate protection. Hence, 
the public is commonly protected through evacuation. In either situation, people will always 
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need to transfer from the affected areas to the designated safety areas, which need to be 
strategically identified. From a practical perspective, studying emergency route planning is of 
great significance and value, especially when the population in areas affected by major 
chemical accidents urgently need to be protected. 
Moreover, unlike natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, major chemical 
accidents might have adverse effects on the health of the population in the affected area due to 
their exposure to the ensuing extreme phenomena (e.g., fallout, toxic clouds, thermal radiation, 
overpressure, or fragments) (Georgiadou et al., 2007). Accurate measurement of these adverse 
effects is the key to choose the correct emergency response plan. Several studies in these areas, 
including many interesting simulation models, have been produced. Many of these studies 
describe the temporal and spatial distribution of the toxic gas diffusion concentration after the 
leakage of hazardous chemicals (Kim, H et al., 2019; Jeong and Baik, 2018) or calculate the 
occurrence of hazardous factors such as shock wave generated by fire and explosion in 
hazardous chemical accidents (Ding, et al., 2020; Khakzad, 2018). 
Emergency route planning can be regarded as a shortest-path problem where the aim is 
to find the path with the smallest sum of weights of the constituent edges between two nodes 
in the graph (composed of nodes and paths) (Shimbel, 1953; Yadav and Biswas, 2010).To 
solve the problem of route selection in emergency response, among the existing studies on 
emergency evacuation management, several models and algorithms based on network theory, 
especially under disaster conditions, are available (Yi and ÖZdamar, 2007; Shi et al., 2012; 
Georgiadou et al., 2010; Xiao et al., 2001; Yuan and Wang, 2009; Stepanov and Smith, 2009; 
Zhang et al., 2013; Georgiadou et al., 2007). Various objective functions are used to evaluate 
the quality of the solutions (Vermuyten et al., 2016). Most of them take time as an optimization 
objective, and only a few consider the health threats of major chemicals to evacuees. Yoo and 
Choi (2019) proposed an evacuation plan that needs to be selective enough to consider the 
indoor and outdoor concentrations of nearby buildings and the time in which the maximum 
allowable concentration may occur. Zhang et al. (2017) built a mixed-integer programing 
model that aims to minimize the concentration of hazardous chemicals where people are 
exposed during the entire evacuation process. When an individual wears no protective 
equipment and if the chosen emergency route considers minimizing transfer time only, the 
individual may suffer from serious health consequences during the emergency transfer. 
Another point that is worth stressing is that the obtained optimal route transit time may be far 
from satisfactory if only mitigating health consequences are considered. Moreover, the effect 
of protective equipment, including respiratory equipment, can significantly vary due to the 
time limit used. 
Given the integration and linkage between the activities of companies within the 
industrial area, these activities are usually close to each other (Hosseinnia et al., 2018). If a 
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major chemical accident occurs in such chemical clusters, then a domino effect occurs 
(Cozzani et al., 2005; Jia et al., 2017; Ding, et al., 2020; Khakzad, 2018). Under such 
circumstances, new challenges and requirements have been added to emergency route 
planning. For example, on April 16, 2004, a liquid chlorine storage tank exploded in Tianyuan 
Chemical Plant, Chongqing, China. Two emergency evacuation decisions were made 
immediately: The first was to evacuate all personnel within the warning area of a radius of 150 
m from the accident point, and the second was carried out 4.5 hours after the first order was 
issued. The plan was to evacuate other personnel within a 1km radius from the accident point 
because the site headquarters was concerned about potential secondary disasters (around 13 
tons of liquid chlorine may explode and leak) (Deng and Jiang, 2009). In the above example, 
the second evacuation plan showed that when selecting the emergency route, decision-makers 
must not only consider mitigating the health consequences of the population but also ensure 
that the affected personnel evacuate safely before secondary disasters could occur. 
Many practical factors should be taken into consideration in emergency route selection. 
An increasing number of researchers have recently been analyzing the impact of the expansion 
of accidents on the speed of evacuation (Zhang et al., 2013).Yuan and Wang (2009) built a 
model to describe the effect of disaster extension on the evacuation speed. Some researchers 
also analyzed the decision-making process of the evacuation. For instance, Smith et al. (2017) 
apply a cognitive modelling approach for  decision making, and use the decision trees to 
assess the route selection strategy based on training curriculum and simulation for learning. 
Meanwhile, they further assessed the impact of the environmental and cognitive factorssuch 
as alarms, fire / smoke, intention, and focus of attention. Recently, Danial et al., (2019) also 
exploredthe role of human involvement and imagination in decision-making process of 
evacuation.. In addition, it was found that those evacuees who have social relationships tend 
to form a group (Hu et al., 2014). Some scholars have modeled the collective phenomena (such 
as competitive, queuing and herding behaviors) evacuation caused by behavioral 
characteristics of individuals in crowds (Sharma, 2009). Ling et al. (2018) use the hypothesis 
of herd behaviour to model the passenger decision-making process. 
However, the impact of individual characteristics, emergency warnings, and emergency 
facilities were not incorporated in their selection strategies. The precursors of major accidents 
are usually often insufficient, and most warnings are released sometimes after the triggering 
events (including leaks, fire, explosion, etc.) (Gai and Deng, 2019). Different communication 
warning channels may cause differences in the time people can access the warning, as 
highlighted by Gai and Deng (2019). Moreover, during any emergency transfer, the differences 
in some factors cause emergency risk types (health risks, time risks) and levels to vary 
significantly, including the speed of different individuals (for example, elderly, youngsters, 
strong young adults, adults who bring their family with them), protection conditions, and 
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available safety destination. Thus, their needs for emergency route planning services vary as 
well (Geogiadou et al., 2010; Carson, 2010; Huang and Chen, 1999). Therefore, providing 
useful targeted emergency guidance for the population in the affected areas can be rather 
difficult, if not impossible, if these practical factors are not considered as part of the decision 
model. 
With regard to the risk assessment of evacuation operations, Norazahar et al. (2015) 
qualitatively discussed the event tree analysis of hazards and consequences. Many scholars 
have conducted quantitative research based on the data of accident, environmental conditions, 
human behavior, and organization (Musharraf et al., 2016; Norafneeza et al., 2018; Norazahar 
et al., 2014). From the perspective of the public, evacuees will inevitably be exposed to risks 
from accidents or secondary disasters from the departure place to the destination; this situation 
is also closely related to the chosen evacuation route. Assessing the risks of evacuees during 
evacuation operations will help in developing a more scientific emergency response plan for 
people in the area. 
In summary, factors such as the expansion of accidents, individual characteristics, 
emergency warnings, and emergency facilities need to be considered in the model. Decision-
makers need to choose their optimization goal(s), which can include time cost and health 
consequences, depending on the disaster scenario. The proposed model is applied to assess the 
emergency reaction risk for major chemical accidents. This study attempts to address some of 
these mentioned aspects. 
The contributions of this study are fivefold: 
(i) The emergency route planning of multi-disaster scenario due to major chemical 
accidents is studied. We do not only consider the health consequences caused by 
the initial incident to the people in the affected area, but also we take into account 
the time pressure of the evacuation caused by the possible secondary disasters. 
(ii) A multi-indicator emergency risk assessment method based on health risk and time 
risk is proposed. It can provide a more comprehensive and informative risk 
assessment than the commonly used single-dimensional assessment method. 
(iii) A modified Dijkstra algorithm is designed to solve the dynamic multi-objective 
route planning problem. It overcomes the weakness of the traditional Dijkstra 
algorithm, which results in a local optimum. The feasibility of the proposed 
algorithm is proven by comparing its results with those of the traditional algorithm. 
(iv) An extensive sensitivity analysis based on a case study is also performed. It mainly 
studies the impact of departure time and evacuees speed on the optimal route and 
contributes to the identification of risk areas and key populations. 
(v) A strategic plan for major accidents that can be adopted in practice is presented. 
Considering the disaster scenarios, individual protective conditions, the time of 
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concerning warnings, the degree of speed, democratic composition, and other 
practical factors, the proposed plan provides a reference for a public protection 
plan during major chemical accidents. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formulation of the 
problem and its modeling. Section 3 presents the solution method. Section 4 illustrates the 
proposed algorithm through a case study from an emergency evacuation network. Section 5 
summarizes the conclusions and highlights some research avenues. 
2.  Modeling of Dynamic Emergency Route Planning for Major Chemical Accidents 
2.1 Formulation of emergency network 
To facilitate the analysis of emergency route planning in major chemical accidents, we 
divide the emergency response area into several sub-areas. From the source node where a given 
affected population is, say vs, the emergency route destination node, say vd, can be determined 
according to the selected protective actions. We consider the entrance of the emergency 
response area as the node vd. In the case where a shelter in place is conducted, the nearest 
shelter building will also be considered vd. instead. The connection ability between nodes vi 
and vj is denoted by the arc (vi, vj).  
We define our emergency network by a directed graph G(V, A), where V = Vs∪Vd, with 
Vs = {vs| s = 1, 2, ∙∙∙, ns } and Vd = {vd| d = 1, 2, ∙∙∙, nd } are the set of source nodes (population 
locations) and the set of destination nodes (entrances of response areas or shelters) respectively; 
A = { (vi, vj)| vi, vj∈V } is the set of arcs. 
Let (xi, yi) denote the coordinates of node vi in the emergency network, and cij(x, y, t) is the 
intensity of the adverse effect (e.g., overpressure, concentration of toxic materials, and heat 
radiation) on arc (vi, vj) at point (x, y) and at time t with (x, y)   (vi, vj); 
 
(1) (x,y): the coordinates of a point on the arc (vi, vj). 
(2) dij: the expected dose when traveling along arc (vi, vj), which is calculated in (Xiao et 
al., 2001) as follows (Georgiadou et al., 2010; Zhou and Liu, 2012): 






d f c x y t dt   (1) 
where ti and tj denote the time when individuals reach node vi and node vj along the arc 
(vi,vj), respectively. 




(4)  ,ij ps t : the travel speed of the population of type p (p = 1, 2, …, Np) on each arc (vi, vj) 
of the network under disaster conditions at time t. 
(5) nijs  : the travel speed of unaffected healthy young adults on arc (vi, vj) under normal 
conditions. 
(6) ts
w: the time when the warning was received. 
 
Under normal conditions, the travel speed of individuals may be affected by their own 
conditions. For example, the travel speed of elderly, children, and disabled people can be 
significantly lower than that of healthy young adults (Menz et al., 2004). Even the travel speed 
of healthy young adults may be affected when they help their family members, such as by 
supporting the elderly and holding young children. 
Thus, suppose the time when the event occurs is time 0 and define 
n
,ij ps  as the travel speed 
of population type p (p = 1, 2, …, Np) on arc (vi, vj) under normal conditions. This can be 
estimated according to the following formula: 
n n
,ij p ijs s                                        (2) 
in which   is the influencing coefficient on speed, indicating the extent to which travel speed 
is affected due to limited mobility or assisting others. The travel speed on each arc of the 
network under disaster conditions  ,ij ps t  may also decrease with the change in time and space, 
which is described as follows (Georgiadou et al., 2010; Yuan and Wang, 2009; Zhang et al., 
2013): 
   n, ,
ijt




    (3) 
 
where αij and βij are the parameters that determine the decrease in the travel speed function
 ,ij ps t . 0,1]ij   and [0, )ij   . 
2.2 Objective functions considering the impact of secondary disasters 
In this section, we discuss three models, which we name models I, II, and III. The first 
two are similar single objective-type problems and differ only in terms of the objective 
function used, whereas the latter treats the problem as a bi-objective problem where the 





If no danger of the possible secondary disasters exists, then the principle for choosing an 
emergency route is to prioritize safety; the objective is then to mitigate health consequences 
during the emergency action. After major chemical accidents occur, less exposure of an 
individual during the transfer corresponds to low health consequences for them (Georgiadou 
et al., 2007). 
Let   
1
, ,..., , |  ; ; { } { };1 2,...,
K ks R R d s s d d R s d k
W v v v v v V v V v V v v R n k K           
be the route with K intermediate nodes, which can include both source and destination nodes. 
The following additional notation is used. 
(1) tij: the time required to travel through arc (vi, vj). 
(2) lij: the length of arc (vi, vj). 
(3) :id the dose at node vi. 
(4) ij  is the decision variable with ij  = 1 if arc (vi, vj) is included in the fixed route and 
0 otherwise. 
 
The formulation of the dynamic emergency route selection (DERS) (model I) for major 
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where (4) represents the objective of the model, which minimizes the expected dose along a 
route. Eqs. (5), (6), (7), and (8) are the recursion formulas of the total travel time along a route, 
which indicate that arc (vi, vj) is traveled through with the speed sij,p(t) during time period tij. 
Eq. (9) is the decrease function of the travel speed on arc (vi, vj) with the expansion of disasters 
and the population type. Eqs. (10) and (11) are used to calculate the expected dose on arc (vi, 
vj) along a route. Constraint (12) guarantees a feasible route from the source node vs to the 
destination node vd by restricting the value of ij . Considering the feasibility of the evacuation 
plan and the urgency of emergency response time, a route with loops is not allowed. Therefore, 
constraint (13) ensures that the routes have no loops. Constraint (14) refers to the binary 
decision variables and the continuous nonnegative variables. This model has 10 constraints, 
2n binary variables, and continuous nonnegative variables. 
 
Model II 
If an individual wears protective equipment, considering that the effective protection time 
of this protective equipment is affected by the type of equipment, then the individual needs to 
reach the safety areas as soon as possible within the effective protection time. Therefore, the 
formulation of DERS (model Ⅱ) for major chemical accidents without secondary disaster risk 
is similar to model I except the objective function given in (15) is used instead. The model is 









  (15) 
subject to Eqs. (5)–(14) 
 




evacuation time ijt  is used instead of the dose  between nodes vi and vj. 
 
Model III 
In this model, both objectives are considered simultaneously, with the objective of model 
I remaining as the main objective function while the objective of the second model is added 
as a constraint to the model. The latter is used to define the target that needs to be fulfilled 
based on the availability of the emergency response. The constraints used in the two earlier 
models remain unchanged. For example, after the initial event occurs, if any risk of secondary 
disasters is present apart from considering health consequences in the process of emergency 
route planning, then the impact of the occurrence and development of secondary disasters on 
the emergency reaction time should also be noted. This problem falls into the scope of multi-
objective optimization where the formulation of DERS (model Ⅲ ) for major chemical 













i s j s
f t L
 
                   (17) 
subject to Eqs. (5)–(14) 
where tL   is the available emergency response time determined by the occurrence and 
development of secondary disasters. 
 
2.3 Application in emergency response risk assessment 
Risk can be broadly defined as a situation in which people or property may suffer adverse 
consequences (Yoo and Choi, 2019). Hazardous chemical accidents are complicated because 
major chemical accidents might have adverse effects on the health of the population in the 
affected area due to their exposure to the ensuing extreme phenomena (e.g., fallout, toxic 
clouds, thermal radiation, overpressure, fragments). In this paper, the risk associated with the 
above health sequence is defined as health risk, which can be estimated through the probit 
function as follows(OGP, 2010; Georgiadou et al., 2010): 
 lnY A B d   (18) 
where Y is the probit variable. Lethality can be determined according to Y, and A and B are 
constants. 




must transfer from the affected area to the safe place within a certain period of time because 
of possible secondary disasters and the limited effective protection time of the emergency 
protective devices they are wearing. In this paper, time risk refers to the combination of other 
adverse consequences caused by time delay. 
In accordance with the emergency route planning results, the emergency response risk of 
the major accidents can be assessed from both transfer time and health consequences 
   w *h , 1, ,s s s p
p P
RE v P t A B f W

    
                               (19) 
   w *t , 2, ,s s s p
p P
RE v P t f W

                               (20)                
where P = {p | p = 1, 2, …, Np} is the set of population type at the source node vs. 
 h , , ws sRE v P t  and  t , , ws sRE v P t  denote the average health consequences and time risk of all 
population type P at the source node vs with the receiving warning time ts
w under major 
accidents. W* indicates the optimal emergency route found by model I, II, or III. ,s p  represents 
the affected proportion of the population of type p in the total population at node vs. 
Let LT and LHC be the threshold values of the high-risk and low-risk area, respectively. 
These values can be found using health consequences and time risks. In this study, the 
emergency risk of the population located at vs is divided into four levels according to Fig. 1. 
a) If vs∈Area Ⅰ, then the time risk and health risk are higher than the acceptable level 
during the emergency transfer of the population located at vs; 
b) If vs∈Area Ⅱ, then the time risk of the population located at vs during the emergency 
transfer is still within the acceptable level, but the health risks exceed the acceptable 
level; 
c) If vs∈Area Ⅲ, then the health risk of the population located at vs during the emergency 
transfer is still within the acceptable level, but the time risk exceeds the acceptable 
level; 
d) If vs∈Area Ⅳ, then both the time and health risks of the population located at vs during 
the emergency transfer are within the acceptable level. 
The above division of the areas can serve as a basis when allocating emergency rescue 
















Fig. 1. Multi-indicator emergency risk assessment method for major chemical accidents 
3. Algorithm for Emergency Route Planning 
Models I and II are both dynamic single-objective models, which can be obtained through 
the modified Dijkstra algorithm (Yuan and Wang, 2009). In this section, we propose a dynamic 
bi-objective model inspired by model III, provide its necessary mathematical validity and then 
present the proposed algorithm. A simple but effective transformation that avoids the algorithm 
from cycling due to the bidirection of the arcs is also introduced, followed by the correctness 
of the entire algorithm. 
 
3.1 Model IV 
First, we normalize the two objective functions and then use the linear weighted sum 
method (Mardle and Miettinen, 2000) to convert model Ⅲ of DERS into a single-objective 




















is the ideal point, which is the solution value of the objective functions of Models 
I and II. 
1 2,r r refer to the weight coefficients associated with functions 1f  and 2f , respectively, with 
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1 2 1 20; 0; 1r r r r     
In the following two lemmas, we will show that the modified Dijkstra algorithm of Yuan 
and Wang (2009) cannot be used to solve model Ⅳ. This limitation led us to develop a 
modified algorithm accordingly. 
 
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that sij,p(t) is a monotonically decreasing and integrable function with 
respect to t when t∈[0,+∞). Then, tj is a monotonically increasing function of ti (Yuan and 
Wang, 2009). 












k denote the values of the objective function F given in Eq. (21), the 
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According to Lemma 3.1,  ,ij ps t is a monotonically decable function with respect to t when
[0, )t  , so tij
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 (25)
 
Obviously, the result of Eq. (25) can be less than 0. Similarly, the result of Eq. (25) can also 
be less than 0 if f{c(x, y, t)} is not a constant. 
3.2 The proposed method 
For the single-objective route selection model under the real-time effect of disaster 
extension, Yuan and Wang (2009) proposed a variant of the Dijkstra algorithm to solve the 
model. This variant is based on the current node’s objective function value, which is a 
monotonically increasing function of its upstream node’s objective function value (see Lemma 
3.1). According to Lemma 3.2, model Ⅳ cannot be solved using this algorithm. To overcome 
this limitation, we introduced some basic modifications, thus creating a new variant of the 
well-known Dijkstra algorithm to optimally determine the shortest path. This new variant is 
performed as follows: 
 
Let WE = { cij(x, y, t), tij, dij, lij, αij, βij, 
n
ijs , ts
w} be the set of arc weights. Let the label P(vj) 
be the value of min F in Eq. (21) from node vs to node vj and the labels TF, T1, and T2 denote 
the sets of the objective function values (F, f1, and f2) of the different routes of the nodes, 
respectively. Let S = {vm|m = 1, 2, …, n} denote the set of nodes whose shortest route has been 
found. The main steps used by the proposed method to solve model Ⅳ is described in Fig. 2. 
In Fig. 2 (a), Nmax represents the number of iterations. This parameter can be determined 
according to the distribution of the solutions in the search space. In Eq. (21), the ideal point 
values of the different nodes are different, but we consider only the known and determined 
node for the ideal point value: the obtained Wj, f1(vd), f2(vd) are the corresponding route, and 
the values of f1 and f2 from node vs to node vd when P(vd) is the minimum objective function 
value F from node vs to node vd. For the other nodes, these corresponding values are the ones 
assigned to the optimal solutions under Eq. (21) with the ideal point values of vd. 
The DERS algorithm shown in Fig. 2 consists of two parts. The main algorithm is shown 
in Fig. 2(a), with the calling algorithm presented in Fig. 2(b). In Fig. 2, we first determine the 
two weight coefficients of the above bi-optimization problem. If it is a single objective 
problem, then the problem is reduced to having 1 2 = (r , ) (0,1) or (1,0) r r   , resulting in the 
corresponding f1
* and f2
* being both 1. In this situation, the algorithm shown in Fig. 2(b) can 
be applied directly. However, if it is a bi-objective problem, then the best route will be 
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constructed at the end of the algorithm through a search space constructed by a vector of weight 
coefficients in Fig. 2(a). 
The essential idea behind the calling algorithm of Fig. 2(b) is that when the Dijkstra 
algorithm is implemented, each additional subsequent node will update the weights of the 
network based on the route that was found. 
Initialization (i=1; r1=0.5; 
r2=0.5; Q=0; M=1; vd)
i<Nmax?


















Fig. 2(a). Main algorithm for DERS 
 
Input WE, r1, r2, f1*, f2*
S≠V?
Calculate and save the objective 
(F, f1, f2) values of the next node 
under the feasible path 
Does this node 
belong to S?
Find the node with the smallest  
objective (F) value that does not 
belong to S









Fig. 2(b). Calling algorithm 
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3.3 Disposal method in the presence of a bidirectional arc 
In the original emergency network, where only safety exits are available. Suppose that 
there are additional emergency shelters, the nodes within the coverage will increase the number 
of potential paths that lead to the emergency shelter. This situation will obviously create a two-
way system in the network. The problem is that the algorithm may cycle if two-way sides are 
present, leading to the wrong result. On the basis of the urgency of emergency reaction, we 
transform the emergency network into two one-way networks to solve this problem. For 
example, consider Fig. 3, where node 3 is the emergency shelter, with the blue circle 
representing its coverage, and node 8 is the safety exit of the emergency network. This problem 
can now be solved according to the location of the transfer population as follows: When 
calculating the nodes within the coverage of the emergency shelter, we use the network in Fig. 






















Network A Network B
 
Fig. 3. Schematic of solutions for networks with bidirectional arcs 
3.4 Correctness of the proposed algorithm 
The following Lemma 3.3 is applied to prove the correctness of the proposed algorithm: 
Lemma 3.3. Assume that W* is the shortest route for model Ⅳ, then f1 (W*) is a monotonically 
decreasing function of the weight coefficient r1, while f2 (W*) is a monotonically increasing 
function of the weight coefficient r1. 
Proof. Suppose W1
* and W2
* are the shortest routes when the weight coefficient r1 of the 
objective value f1 is a and b respectively. Let a > b ≥ 0, equivalent to (1b) > (1a) ≥ 0, then 
 
* * *
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 )f W a f W a f W a f W a




1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 )f W b f W b f W b f W b
           (27) 
which leads to  
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1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] (1 ) 0f W f W b f W f W b
         (29) 
Therefore, we can deduce that 
 
*
1 1 1 2( ) ( ) 0f W f W




2 1 2( ) ( ) 02f W f W
    (31) 
On the basis of the above proof and Lemma 3.3, the range [0,1] of the weight coefficient 
can be taken as the search space, and a simple dichotomy search can then be used to refine the 
search interval, leading to the solution of model IV. 
On the basis of the above definitions and Lemma 3.2, the correctness of the algorithm in 
Fig. 2(b) can be proved by recurrence as follows: 
(1) When S = vs, the conclusion is obviously true. 
(2) Suppose that the conclusion is right when S = S vn, i.e., for each node vj where 
jv S , and P(vj) is the minimum objective value F from node vs to node vj. 
(3) Let us prove whether the algorithm remains valid when S = S  vn+1. From the 




F v T v





P v F v

，S = S∪vx can be 
obtained. 
Suppose that H is an arbitrary feasible route from node vs to vx. Given vs ∈S and vx ∉S, 
along route H, an arc exists whose origin node is in S while the destination node is not in S. 
Now, suppose that (vr, vl) is the first one among those arcs along route H, i.e., vr∈S, vl ∉S. 
When vl = vx, according to Lemma 3.2, the shortest route of vr is assumed to be found, which 
means P(vr) = Fr
1. Fr
H > P(vr), but Fx
H along this route is less than Fx
1 along the shortest route 
of vr, In this case, Wx ≠ Wr∪vx. This concept also proves that the modified Dijkstra algorithm 
proposed by Yuan and Wang (2009) cannot be used to solve the DERS model. When the 
algorithm selects the next node, it recognizes the shortest route of the upstream node as the 
only route to calculate the objective value and ignores the correct route to minimize the 
objective value of the node. With the introduction of the loop of “Does this node belong to S” 
in Fig. 2(b), TF(vx) now contains all the objective values calculated along the route, which 
means that all nodes in the route belong to the set S. When vl ≠ vx, 
* * *
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] (1 ) 0f W f W a f W f W a
       
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( ) min{ ( )} min ( )
j j
H H
x j F j j jx
v S v S
P v F v T v F F
 
    . This idea is true because of the nonnegative nature of 
the weighted sum objective value F. In other words, P(vx) is the minimum objective value F 
from node vs to node vx. 
4. Computational Results 
In this section, we first introduce the case that will be used for our computational 
experiments followed by an illustration of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. Some computational results 
and analysis are then produced for the case of without and with secondary disaster risks. 
4.1. Introduction and description 
Fig. 4 is an emergency network that has 20 nodes; the coordinates of each node in the 
network are shown in Table 1. The initial traveling speed sijn and the speed attenuation 
parameters αij and βij are given in Table 2. Assume that a liquid ammonia tank at node 1 leaks. 
A set of concrete parameters (leakage parameters, meteorological conditions, etc.) are selected 
to calculate the consequences of the leak, as shown in Table 3. For the convenience of 
calculation, the Gaussian plume model is used to calculate the ammonia concentration at each 
node (Ding et al., 2007). On the basis of the vulnerability of humans (OGP, 2010), the toxicant 











   (32) 
where Ci, Cj are the concentration of ammonia at nodes vi and vj. ppm; and n is the power 
exponent, which is n = 2 for ammonia. 
The probit recommended below is published by a recognized body (Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research) and used by regulators. A and B in Eq. (21) are 
−16.33 and 1, respectively. Suppose that the thresholds of high-risk and low-risk areas are 































Fig. 4. Emergency network structure 
Table 1 Coordinates of nodes 
Node (x, y) Node (x, y) Node (x, y) Node (x, y) 
1 (0,0) 6 (130,0) 11 (135,−65) 16 (265, −76.123) 
2 (50,221.02) 7 (150,220) 12 (290,94.893) 17 (380.46,4.433) 
3 (130,320) 8 (260,220) 13 (500,160) 18 (565,−50) 
4 (340,300) 9 (580,200) 14 (690,191.575) 19 (650,35) 
5 (720,250) 10 (850,160) 15 (805,92.861) 20 (875,−65) 
Table 2 Evacuation network structure and speed parameters 
(vi,vj) (sijn,αij,βij)(m/min,-,-) (vi,vj) (sijn,αij,βij)(m/min,-,-) (vi,vj) (sijn,αij,βij)(m/min,-,-) 
(1,2) (100,0.85,0.07) (6,16) (75,0.86,0.09) (14,10) (115,1,0) 
(1,6) (60,0.83,0.07) (7,8) (90,0.89,0.08) (14,15) (105,1,0) 
(1,11) (115,0.84,0.09) (8,4) (85,0.92,0.03) (15,20) (30,1,0) 
(2,3) (60,0.88,0.09) (8,13) (75,0.92,0.01) (16,17) (115,0.85,0.06) 
(2,7) (70,0.82,0.06) (9,5) (65,1,0) (16,18) (70,0.83,0.05) 
(3,4) (100,0.98,0.01) (9,14) (90,1,0) (17,13) (80,0.91,0.02) 
(3,8) (95,0.95,0.01) (10,15) (35,1,0) (17,18) (75,0.95,0.04) 
(4,5) (120,0.99,0.01) (11,16) (70,0.89,0.07) (18,13) (45,0.99,0.02) 
(4,9) (85,0.98,0.02) (12,8) (65,0.99,0.02) (18,19) (110,0.97,0.01) 
(5,10) (50,1,0) (12,17) (100,0.95,0.03) (18,20) (120,0.93,0.04) 
(6,7) (65,0.85,0.05) (13,9) (40,0.98,0.05) (19,15) (75,1,0) 
(6,12) (105,0.82,0.06) (13,19) (120,0.98,0.04) (19,20) (100,1,0) 
Table 3 Parameter specification 
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Leakage parameter Meteorological parameters 
Volume (m3) 50 Average temperature (℃) 25 
Cleft shape Circular Average wind speed (m/s) 3.5 
Cleft diameter (mm) 100 Prevailing wind direction  East wind 
Cleft height (from the ground) (m) 2.4 Solar radiation intensity  Weak 
Cleft height (from liquid level) (m) 1.3   
Internal pressure (pa) 1000000   
Density (kg/m3) 608   
Height measured (m)               1.67 
4.2. Illustration of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 
In this subsection, an example is analyzed to illustrate the theoretical results discussed in 
the previous section. To compare with the modified Dijkstra algorithm proposed by Yuan and 
Wang (2009), we use their data and model to perform our computational experiment. The 
algorithms were implemented in Java and run on a PC with 2.60 GHZ CPU and 16 GB RAM. 
Table 4 illustrates the process of solving the shortest route from node v1 to node v20. The result 
obtained by the algorithm is different from that achieved by Yuan and Wang (2009), as shown 
in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Shortest evacuation route obtained through the method illustrated in Fig. 2(b) and the 
modified Dijkstra algorithm proposed by Yuan and Wang (2009) 
r1 Route F method 
0.77 
1→6→12→17→18→20 (W1) 0.084 the algorithm illustrated in Fig. 2 (b) 
1→11→16→18→20 (W2) 0.085 
the modified Dijkstra algorithm proposed by 
Yuan and Wang (2009) 
In summary, W1 is shorter than W2 with respect to the optimization objective function 
shown in Eq. (12) by Yuan and Wang (2009). 
In addition, the F value of the route 1→11→16→18 (W3) is −0.33042842, which is smaller 
than F = −0.33042841 of the route 1→6→12→17→18 (W4). However, results show that W4 
is part of the shortest route when node 20 is the destination node. This observation is supported 
by Lemma 3.2 because the objective function is not an increasing function. 
In the proposed method, while obtaining the shortest route at node 18, the objective value 
of the route W4 is recorded and the target value of the subsequent nodes is updated accordingly. 
This is not the case for the modified Dijkstra algorithm proposed by Yuan and Wang (2009), 



































Fig. 5. Dose and time by model Ⅳ with respect to r1 
 
On the basis of the data in Section 4.1, the curves of f1 and f2 are shown in Fig. 5 when 
the weight coefficient r1 varies from 0 to 1 while the other parameters are kept fixed. The 
simulation results are consistent with the theoretical analysis of Lemma 3.3. 
4.3. Results for major accidents without secondary disaster risks 
Here, we analyze the case when no secondary disaster occurs. 
Assume that the speed of individuals at the source nodes is affected by the influencing 
factor   = 1. People located at the nodes within the coverage of the emergency evacuation 
shelter take the shelter as their destination, and those at other nodes take the exits of the 
emergency response area as their destination. Those who are outside the coverage will not 
venture into the emergency shelter because of the limitation of the evacuation shelter. The 
assumptions here are that the time for everyone to receive the warning ts
w = 0 and that no risk 
of secondary disasters exists. 
On the basis of Models I and II, the emergency route planning results of each node can be 
obtained according to whether or not personnel wear protective respiratory devices or not (see 
Appendix 1). This situation is of great significance to the overall planning of the evacuation 
network, given that people in the affected area are evacuated from more than one location. The 
health consequences of personnel taking emergency actions at each node are shown in Fig. 6 
for Models I and II. 
Figs. 4 and 6 show that if more routes can be chosen between the source node and the 
corresponding destinations (such as nodes 1, 3, 11, and 16), then the optimal emergency route 
for the same node obtained based on Models I and II are different. On the whole, the difference 
in health risks obtained between different nodes with the same objective is relatively too large. 
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This situation occurs not only because of the location of the node and the wind direction will 
cause the difference in the concentration of toxic gas diffusion between each other but also 
because the different evacuation destinations will also affect the health risk of the evacuees. 
For example, the positions of nodes 13 and 9 in the network are roughly the same, but because 
the evacuated people of node 13 can go to the emergency shelter, the health risk is much 
smaller than that of node 9. This finding shows that well-protected emergency shelters have a 
very significant effect on reducing the impact of accidents and reducing the risk of evacuation. 
However, reasonable planning of the location and capacity of emergency shelters is critical to 
ensuring public safety because of the constraints of cost and urban space. Moreover, the health 
consequences of the optimal route calculated through model II are relatively higher than those 
calculated through model Ⅰ. This finding indicates that when the individual does not wear a 
respiratory protective device and if the transfer time is the only optimization objective function 
in route planning, then the individual may face much higher health risks during the emergency 
transfer. 
On the basis of health consequences and transfer time, the emergency reaction area is 
divided into high-risk area and low-risk area. On the basis of model Ⅰ, the assessment results 
over the emergency route planning of each node evaluated by Eq. (19) are displayed in Fig. 
7(a). The evaluation results of Eq. (20) based on model Ⅱ are shown in Fig. 7(b). (Nodes 8 and 
20 do not perform calculations because they are destination nodes.) We can conclude through 
Fig. 7(a) that if individuals wear no respiratory protective devices and are located at nodes that 
are far away from the destinations (including nodes 1, 6, 11, 16, 17, 18, and 19), then their 
health is at higher risk. The result of Fig. 7(b) shows that nodes 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, and 16 are in 
the high-risk area. 
A comparison between Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) shows that when applying Models I and II, 
respectively, the division results of the health risk and time risk corresponding to the 
emergency routes overlap, although some differences still exist. The differences can be 
significant when the source node is close to the poisonous gas diffusion direction and closer 
to the destination or the source node deviates from the poisonous gas diffusion direction and 
farther from the destination, such as nodes 9, 17, 18, 19, and 6. If model I or II is adopted only 
to find the emergency route of each node, then the assessment results of the time risk and 
health risk hardly reflect the overall emergency risk level corresponding to each node，At the 
same time, it may also put evacuees in a dangerous situation. For example, when only time 
risk is considered, the evacuation route chosen by the evacuees at node 17 is low risk, but it 
will pose serious health threats, which is unbearable. From the perspective of choosing the 
optimal emergency route, the area division results will not only affect the overall emergency 
action but also determine the whole emergency network risk warning system planning and the 
evacuation plan design. The necessary step is to give people in high-risk areas early warning 
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notices and allow them to enter well-protected emergency shelters or safe places as soon as 
possible. In summary, we need to provide a comprehensive reference for the public protection 
plan of major chemical accidents according to the personnel protection situation and the 
number of regional refuge facilities. 
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Fig. 7. Risk area division based on Models I and II: (a) optimize f1 and (b) optimize f2 
 We can also test the impact of the warning time and the level of the speed on the effect of 
the emergency route planning results and risk assessment, as shown in Figs. 8 and 9. 
Fig. 8 shows the emergency risk of the optimal routes for node 14 on the basis of Models 
I and II with respect to ts
w. From Fig. 8, whether the personnel located at node 14 wear 
protective devices or not, if the warning time is delayed, then their health and time risks will 
increase correspondingly during their emergency transfer. If the period between the occurrence 
of the accident and the time warning reaches 1 minute, then the emergency time risk will 
increase from a low to high. If this amount reaches 3 minutes, then the emergency health risk 
will elevate to a high level. Fig. 9 shows the emergency risk of the optimal routes for different 
population types of node 15 on the basis of Models I and II. As shown in Fig. 9, the extent of 
speed being affected is increased for the population located at node 15, resulting in increased 
health and time risks during the emergency transfer. When the speed influencing coefficient 
  decreases to 0.8, the emergency health risk will rise from a low to a high level; when it   
decreases to 0.6, the emergency time risk will increase from a low to a high level. The 
evacuation area includes not only healthy adults but also a certain number of children and the 
elderly. In emergency evacuation operations, if slower-moving people are not assisted in 
avoiding danger, then the safety of the group will be more threatened compared with that of 
healthy adults. 
Simulation results 
The simulation results show that the proposed dynamic emergency route planning model 
helps identify high-risk groups and assists in optimizing emergency resource allocation on 
the basis of several factors: disaster scenarios, individual protective conditions, time of 
releasing warnings, and degree of speed, among others. 
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Fig. 8. Emergency risk of the optimal routes for node 14 based on Models I and II with 
respect to ts
w 




















               calculated based on model Ⅰ 
              calculated based on model Ⅱ 
 h 15 , ,0RE v P




















Fig. 9. Emergency risk of the optimal routes for node 15 based on Models I and II with 
respect to  
4.4 Results of dynamic route selection for major accidents with secondary disaster risk 
In this case, we examine the case when secondary disaster risks exist. 
Assume that the available emergency reaction time Lt = 16 minutes under the threat of 




  = 1 and the time the warning is received ts
w = 0. Also, suppose that the emergency shelter 
cannot provide adequate protective devices and all personnel in the emergency network need 
to transfer to safety exits. The proposed algorithm can solve model III and obtain the optimal 
emergency route for each node and thus help evaluate the emergency risk of different regions 
(Appendix 2). 
Appendices 1 and 2 suggest that the optimal emergency route obtained through model III 
is sometimes a tradeoff between the solutions that corresponds to the ideal point (such as node 
1). If the emergency route found by model I or II in the current accident scenario is still adopted, 
then the population may face higher time or health risk. Moreover, for the nodes within the 
coverage area of the emergency shelter, individuals may choose the optimal route either to the 
emergency shelters that meet the shelter requirements or through the emergency response area 
exits to destination areas. The latter presents significant higher risks than the former. 
On the basis of the results of Appendix 2 and the multi-indicator emergency risk 
assessment proposed in Section 2.3, the nodes in the emergency network are divided into 
different emergency risk areas, as shown in Fig. 10. Compared with the emergency risk area 
division under the single indicator in Fig.7, the emergency risk area division method in Fig. 
10 reflects clearly both the level of health and time risks during the emergency transfer of the 
population at each node. The priority should be protecting the people in this area because of 
the relatively high health and time risks of the node in Area Ⅰ. In addition to the necessary 
emergency early warning system and emergency protective equipment, an emergency shelter 
that meets protection conditions can be established to reduce casualties; nodes located in Area 
Ⅱ have higher health risks and lower time risks. Sufficient emergency protective equipment is 
more needed by people in this area; nodes located in Area Ⅲ have higher time risks and low 
health risks. A scientific and complete emergency early warning system should be established 
for this area to buy precious time for the evacuation of the people in this area; the two risks of 
the node located in Area IV are relatively low and can be taken under the premise of 
considering other conditions such as cost due to necessary emergency management measures. 
In summary, the results can comprehensively demonstrate the emergency risk level of the 
people in different areas affected by major chemical accidents. This information provides 













































Fig. 10. Area division results of the multi-indicator emergency risk 
 
For example, on the basis of model III, node 14 is selected to help analyze the influence 
of demographic composition on the emergency risk area division. The population is divided 
into two groups:   = 0.5 for people affected and   = 1 otherwise. On the basis of the multi-
indicator emergency risk assessment method proposed in Section 2.3, the change in the risk 
area division at node 14 with 14, =0.5 , which is the ratio of those whose speed get affected to 
the population, is shown in Fig. 11. We can conclude from Fig. 11 that if this ratio goes up, 
then the whole area’s emergency risk level will increase. In addition, if the ratio is greater than 
20%, then the emergency risk will reach a high level. 
The simulation results show that the dynamic emergency route planning model helps 
identify high-risk populations considering both health and time risks on the basis of various 
factors such as disaster scenario and the ratio of people whose speed is affected, among others. 
In other words, this approach further optimizes the allocation of emergency resources. 
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Fig. 11. Corresponding risk of node 14 changes with  
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
Emergency route planning for major chemical accidents is different from that for natural 
disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes. Major chemical accidents are characterized by 
delay in early warning and possible secondary disasters, which is why considering various 
factors in emergency route planning is necessary. These factors could include possible 
secondary disasters (such as fire caused by explosion, explosion caused by leaks, leaks caused 
by explosion, and others), expansion of accidents, warning release time, the level that 
individual speed is affected, emergency facilities, and demographic composition, among 
others. In this study, we propose a dynamic emergency route planning model for major 
chemical accidents. Our study considers the abovementioned factors and takes one or more 
factors in health consequences or transfer time as the optimization objective functions. We 
propose a modification of the well-known Dijkstra algorithm to deal with the bi-objective 
optimization problem for emergency route selection under the real effect of disaster extension 
for major chemical accidents. As a byproduct of the study, we also propose an interesting and 
informative individual emergency risk classification method for major chemical accidents that 
takes both health consequences and transfer time risk into consideration. 
Simulation results show the feasibility and advantages of the models and algorithms 




a) First, the optimal route based on different optimization objectives may vary. This is 
mainly determined by the complexity of the emergency network. At the same time, 
when an individual does not wear any protective devices, the emergency route planning 
strategy that chooses the optimization of transfer time as the objective may end up 
exposing people to higher health risks. For example, the time risk of the evacuation 
route based on Model II at node 1 is only reduced by (11.07-13.49) / 13.49 × 100% = 
17.9%, but the health risk is increased by (5.86114-3.96556) / 3.96556 × 100% = 47.8%. 
b) Second, the later the people receive the warning,the longer they will stay in the affected 
area, and consequently their health and time risks during transfer will also increase 
accordingly. For those whose speed is affected due to limited mobility or assisting others, 
their health and time risks are also higher than those of healthy young adults. 
c) Third, traveling to a nearer emergency shelter that meets shelter requirements is safer 
for the population than adding safety exits. This can not only reduce  the evacuation 
time, but also decrease the health threat brought by the accident. This may need to have 
certain requirements for the protection effect of shelter requirements in the case of no 
secondary disaster. 
d) Fourth, in emergency response area risk assessment, the demographic constituent should 
be taken as a factor that demands attention. With the increase in the ratio of people in 
the emergency reaction area whose evacuation speed is affected, the total regional risk 
will increase accordingly. 
In summary, the proposed dynamic emergency route planning model can be used to identify 
the population that faces high health and time risks according to disaster scenarios, individual 
protective conditions, warning release time, the affected extent of speed, and the proportion of 
people whose speed is affected to the total population, among other factors. This scheme can 
provide a reference for the optimization of emergency resource allocation and the formulation 
and the implementation of effective emergency plans. 
This study can be extended as follows: 
(i) The proposed optimization algorithm can be applied to similarly constrained 
optimization problems, such as route selection of emergency rescue teams caused 
by other disasters, logistics management, and other fields. In addition, the results 
of the optimal path of different nodes in the network can provide references for the 
allocation of shelters and emergency resource management in emergency 
management. 
(ii) This paper mainly studies the evacuation behavior of individuals in emergency 
response. The main factors that were used are individual characteristics and 
departure time. These details can be combined with the development of smartphone 
technology, which allows specific emergency evacuation guidance to be 
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systematically provided for specific individuals when a disaster occurs. Future 
research can also cover the limitations of group factors in emergency actions, such 
as the impact of people flow on individual speed. 
(iii) The regional emergency risk assessment results are combined with the new 
generation of information technology, such as big data and spatial geographic 
information integration. This combination will enable the improved management 
of the operation of a city in an integrated and systematic way, thus promoting the 
wisdom of urban planning, construction, management, and service. 
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Model Ⅰ Model Ⅱ 
Optimization 
objectives 
Mitigation of health consequences Minimizing transfer time 
 
route dose  
transfer time 
(min) 
route dose  
transfer time 
(min) 
 1→11→16→ 18→ 13→ 
9→ 14→ 15→ 20 
8.88E+10 33.94 
1→ 11→ 16→ 




2→ 7→ 8 4.41E-17 3.54 2→ 7→ 8 4.41E-17 3.54 
 3→ 4→ 8 4.09E-17 3.76 3→ 8 4.75E-17 1.83 
 4→ 8 3.83E-17 1.48 4→ 8 3.83E-17 1.48 
 5→ 10→ 15→ 20 1.52E+08 11.23 5→ 10→ 15→ 20 1.52E+08 11.23 
 6→ 12→ 8 1.44E+10 2.31 6→ 12→ 8 1.44E+10 2.31 
 7→8 3.77E-17 1.45 7→8 3.77E-17 1.45 
 8 0 0 8 0 0 
 9→ 14→ 15→ 20 1.47E+08 8.43 9→ 14→ 15→ 20 1.47E+08 8.43 
 10→ 15→ 20 1.52E+08 8.07 10→ 15→ 20 1.52E+08 8.07 
 
11→ 16→ 18→ 20 6.52E+08 13.49 
11→ 16→ 17→ 
18→ 19→ 20 
4.34E+09 11.07 
 12→8 224 2.04 12→8 224 2.04 
 13→ 8 127 3.65 13→ 8 127 3.65 
 14→ 15→ 20 1.47E+08 7.20 14→ 15→ 20 1.47E+08 7.20 
 15→ 20 1.42E+08 5.76 15→ 20 1.42E+08 5.76 
 16→ 18→ 20 5.68E+08 9.81 16→ 17→ 18→ 20 3.82E+09 8.13 
 17→ 12→ 8 7.71E+08 3.47 17→ 12→ 8 7.71E+08 3.47 
 18→ 20 2.37E+08 2.95 18→ 20 2.37E+08 2.95 
 19→ 20 2.02E+08 2.46 19→ 20 2.02E+08 2.46 
 20 0 0 20 0 0 
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Appendix 2: Multi-objective optimization results of emergency route selected based 
on Model III 




Route dose  
transfer time 
(min) 
1→11→16→18→19→20 8.88E+10 15.71 11→16→18→20 6.52E+08 13.49 
2→7→8→13→19→20 2.84E+08 12.12 12→8→4→9→14→15→20 1.47E+08 15.51 
3→4→9→14→15→20 1.47E+08 13.97 13→9→14→15→20 1.47E+08 10.85 
4→9→14→15→20 1.47E+08 11.65 14→15→20 1.47E+08 7.20 
5→10→15→20 1.52E+08 11.23 15→20 1.42E+08 5.76 
6→12→8→ 13→19→20 1.47E+10 13.16 16→18→20 5.68E+08 9.81 
7→8→4→9→14→15→20 1.47E+08 14.86 17→13→9→14→15→20 1.69E+09 14.00 
8→4→9→14→15→20 1.47E+08 13.23 18→ 20 2.37E+08 2.95 
9→14→15→20 1.47E+08 8.43 19→ 20 2.02E+08 2.46 
10→15→20 1.52E+08 8.07 20 0 0 
 
